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support.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, the United States and several European countries
expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection
of intellectual property in many developing countries. The developed countries made
the upgrading of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection one of their highest
priorities for the Uruguay Round of trade talks. Their eﬀorts in those negotiations
bore fruit in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), which was approved as part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round.
The TRIPs agreement establishes minimum standards of protection for several
categories of intellectual property. For example, in the area of new technology, it
requires countries to grant patents to a broad class of innovations for a minimum
of twenty years and to treat foreign and domestic patent applicants alike. But IPR
protection remains a highly contentious issue in international relations between the
North and the South, because many developing countries believe that the TRIPs
agreement was forced upon them by their economically more powerful trading part-
ners and that this move toward harmonization of patent policies serves the interests
of the North at the expense of those of the South.
In a country that is closed to international trade, the design of a system of IPR
protection poses a clear trade-oﬀ to a welfare-maximizing government. By strength-
ening the protection of intellectual property, a government provides greater incentives
for innovation and thus the beneﬁts that come from having more and better products.
But, at the same time, it curtails potential competition for ﬁrms that have previously
innovated and thus limits the beneﬁts that can be realized from existing products.
As Nordhaus (1969) argued, the optimal patent policy equates the marginal dynamic
beneﬁt with the marginal static eﬃciency loss.
B u ti na no p e ne c o n o m y ,t h et r a d e - o ﬀs are not so clear cut. International trade
spreads the beneﬁts of innovation beyond national boundaries. This means that a
country does not reap all of the global beneﬁts that come from protecting intellectual
property within its borders. Moreover, countries diﬀer in their capacities for innova-
tion due to diﬀerences in skill endowments and technical know-how. It is not obvious
1how a government ought to set its national IPR policy if some of the beneﬁts of its
national innovation accrue to foreigners, if its constituents beneﬁt from innovations
that are encouraged and take place beyond its boundaries, and if domestic and foreign
ﬁrms diﬀer in their ability to innovate.
Some previous research has addressed the question of whether a country with a
limited capacity to innovate will beneﬁt from extending IPR protection to foreign
inventors. Chin and Grossman (1990) and Deardorﬀ (1992) investigated the welfare
eﬀects of extending patent protection from the country in which innovation takes
place to another country that only consumes the innovative products. Both of these
papers treat the investment in R&D as a once-oﬀ decision. In contrast, Helpman
(1993) models innovation as an ongoing process and associates the strength of the
IPR regime with the ﬂow probability that a given product protected by a patent in
the North will be imitated in the South. He evaluates the welfare consequences of
marginal changes in the rate of imitation. These papers do not, however, consider the
simultaneous choice of IPR protection by trade partners, nor do they discuss what
international regime of IPR protection would be globally eﬃcient.1
In this paper, we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual
property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing
innovation in which there are two countries that diﬀer in market sizes and in their
capacities for conducting research and development. Innovators develop the designs
for new products, each of which has a limited economic life. We associate the strength
of IPR protection with the duration of a country’s patents. Patents provide inventors
with exclusive rights to produce, sell and distribute their products within a country.
We study a regime with national treatment, which means that the same protection
is provided to all inventors regardless of their national origin.
W eb e g i ni nS e c t i o n2w i t ht h ec a s eo fac l o s e de c o n o m y . T h e r ew er e - e x a m i n e
the trade-oﬀ between static costs and dynamic beneﬁts that was ﬁrst studied by
Nordhaus. We derive a neat formula that characterizes the optimal patent policy in
1McCalman (1997) addresses some of these issues in a model of once-oﬀ innovation by a single
ﬁrm in a developed economy.
2a closed economy, and discuss the determinants of the optimal patent length. One
interesting ﬁnding is that the optimal duration of patents may be independent of or
even decreasing in the size of the economy.
In Section 3, we describe the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative
regime of patent protection. We derive best response functions for the “North” and
the “South,” where the North is assumed to have a higher wage than the South, as
well as possibly a larger market for innovative products and a greater capacity for
innovation. The best response is a patent length that maximizes a country’s national
welfare, given the duration of patents in its trading partner. We characterize the best
responses, compare the incentives for providing protection for intellectual property in
an open economy to those that exist in a closed economy, and explain the strategic
interactions between countries in the setting of their patent policies.
In Section 4, we ask, Why are patents longer in the North? If the capacity for
R&D greater in the North than in the South and the market for innovative products
is at least as large there, then patent duration will be longer in the North than in
the South in a Nash equilibrium. We explain why relative market size and relative
productivity in innovation matter for the relative incentives to protect intellectual
property. Patents are a more potent instrument for stimulating innovation in the
relatively larger market. And a country that invents a smaller share of the world’s
innovative products will ﬁnd more incentive to curtail patent protection so as to
beneﬁt local consumers at the expense of producers.
We study international patent agreements in Section 5. First we derive the proper-
ties of an eﬃcient global regime of patent protection. An eﬃc i e n tp a t e n tr e g i m ei so n e
that provides the optimal aggregate incentives for innovation to inventors throughout
the world. These incentives can be achieved by various combinations of patent poli-
cies in the two countries, so there is no unique pair of patent lengths that is needed for
global eﬃciency. However, diﬀerent ways of achieving the optimal aggregate incen-
tives have diﬀerent implications for the distribution welfare between the North and
the South. Among combinations of policies that give the same overall incentives for
global research, the North fares better, and the South worse, the longer are patents
3in the South. An implication of our ﬁndings is that harmonization of patent poli-
cies is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for global eﬃciency. Moreover, starting from
a non-cooperative equilibrium with longer patents in the North than in the South,
an eﬃcient agreement calling for harmonization of patent lengths beneﬁts the North
quite possibly at the expense of the South.
Readers familiar with the literature on trade policy will recognize a familiar struc-
ture in our inquiry. Our examination of a non-cooperative regime of patent protec-
tion is analogous to Johnson’s (1953-54) study of non-cooperative tariﬀ setting by
two large countries. Our subsequent identiﬁcation of the eﬃcient combinations of
patent policies is analogous to Mayer’s (1981) similar examination of the eﬃcient
combinations of trade policies. We, like Mayer, associate the eﬃciency frontier with
the possible outcomes of an international negotiation.
In Section 6, we extend our analysis of both the non-cooperative and coopera-
tive settings to a world with many trading countries. The many country model is
qualitatively similar to the two-country model, although the addition of more coun-
tries exacerbates the ineﬃciencies associated with non-cooperation. Our ﬁndings are
summarized in Section 7.
2 A Simple Model of Innovation
In this section, we construct a simple model of ongoing innovation. We develop the
model for a closed economy and use it to revisit the question of the optimal patent
length that was ﬁrst addressed by Nordhaus (1969). Our model yields a neat formula
that characterizes the trade-oﬀ between the static costs and dynamic beneﬁts of
extending the period of patent protection. The discussion of a closed economy lays
the groundwork for the more subtle analysis of the international system that we
undertake in the sections that follow.
The economy has two sectors, one that produces a homogeneous good and an-
other that produces a continuum of diﬀerentiated products. The designs for the
diﬀerentiated products result from private investments in R&D. Once a good has
4been invented, it has a ﬁnite economic life of length ¯ τ. That is, a new product po-
tentially provides utility to consumers for a period of ¯ τ from the time of its creation,
w h e r e u p o ni t sv a l u et oc o n s u m e r sd r o p st oz e r o .
There are M consumers with identical preferences. We shall refer to M as the












y(z) is consumption of the homogeneous good at time z, x(i,z) is consumption of the
ith variety of diﬀerentiated product at time z,a n dn(z) is the measure of diﬀerentiated
products invented before z that still hold value to consumers at time z. We assume
that h0(x) > 0, h00(x) < 0, h0(0) = ∞,a n d−xh00(x)/h0(x) < 1 for all x.T h et h i r d
assumption ensures a positive demand for every variety at any ﬁnite price. The fourth
ensures that any ﬁrm holding a patent for a diﬀerentiated product will charge a ﬁnite
price.
A consumer maximizes utility by purchasing some of all varieties that are not yet
obsolete. He chooses x(i,z) so that h0[x(i,z)] = p(i,z) for all i and z,w h e r ep(i,z) is
the price of variety i at time z. After the consumer makes all of his optimal purchases
of diﬀerentiated products at time z, he devotes the remainder of his spending to
the homogeneous good y. Spending is always positive in the equilibria we describe.
This means that the interest rate is constant and equal to ρ, from the condition for
intertemporal optimization.
Manufacturing requires only labor. Any ﬁrm can produce good y with a units of
labor per unit of output. All known varieties of the diﬀerentiated product also can
2In our model, demand for diﬀerentiated products does not vary with income. Thus, a rich
country need not have a larger market for these goods than a poor country. Nonetheless, we prefer
to think of the market for diﬀerentiated goods as being larger in the North than in the South. This
could be rigorously justiﬁed within our model if we were to suppose that diﬀerentiated products
provide utility only after a threshold level of consumption of the homogeneous goods has been
reached. Then, a rich country is likely to have more consumers who surpass the threshold.
5be produced with a units of labor per unit of output. But the government grants the
original designer of a diﬀerentiated product the sole rights of production and sale for
ap e r i o do fl e n g t hτ. We assume that patents are perfectly enforced.
The design of new varieties requires both labor and human capital. For simplicity,
we take φ(z) ≡ F[H,LR (z)] = {b[LR(z)/a]
β +( 1− b)Hβ}1/β,w h e r eφ(z) is the ﬂow
of new inventions at time z, H is the (constant) stock of human capital, LR(z) is the
amount of labor devoted to R&D, and a is a measure of labor productivity as before.
This is, of course, a production function with a constant elasticity of substitution
between labor and human capital. We assume that β ≤ 1/2, or equivalently that the
elasticity of substitution is less than or equal to two. This assumption is suﬃcient
(but not necessary) to ensure that any patent length that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition for an interior optimum also satisﬁes the second-order condition. Note that
˙ n(z)=φ(z) − φ(z − ¯ τ), because the goods that were invented at time z − ¯ τ become
obsolete at time z.
We describe now the static and dynamic equilibrium for an economy that has
a patent duration of τ. In equilibrium, ﬁrms with live patents for diﬀerentiated
products behave as monopolies. Each such ﬁrm faces an inverse demand curve from
each of the M consumers with the form p(x)=h0(x). The ﬁrm sets its price so that
(p−aw)/p = −xh00/h0,w h e r ew is the wage rate and x is sales per consumer. This is
the usual monopoly-pricing rule whereby the markup over unit cost as a fraction of
the price is equal to the inverse demand elasticity. Optimal pricing yields a typical
patent holder proﬁts of π per consumer, and total proﬁts of Mπ.
When a patent expires, competitors can imitate the good costlessly. Then the
product sells for the competitive price of p = aw and generates no further proﬁts.
This pricing of the good continues until the good becomes obsolete. Meanwhile,
the homogeneous good always carries the competitive price of aw,w h i c h ,b e c a u s e
this good is the numeraire, implies that w =1 /a. In writing this condition, we
implicitly assume that the economy’s labor supply is suﬃciently large that some
labor remains for production of the homogeneous good after all derived demand for
labor for producing diﬀerentiated products and conducting R&D has been satisﬁed.
6Labor engages in manufacturing and R&D. The labor employed in manufacturing
diﬀerentiated goods is just the amount needed to produce the quantities demanded
at the equilibrium prices. The allocation of labor to R&D is such that its marginal
value product in this activity is equal to the wage rate. Thus,
vFL(H,LR)=w, (3)
where v is the value of a new patent. Since there is no uncertainty about future
earnings, patents are worth the discounted value of the proﬁts they generate in the








We can see from (3) and (4) that an increase in the patent length increases the value
of a new patent, thereby drawing additional resources into R&D.
The ﬁnal equilibrium condition equates savings with investment. Savings are the
diﬀerence between national income rH + wL + nmMπ and aggregate spending E,
where r is the return to human capital, L is the aggregate labor supply, and nm is the
number of diﬀerentiated products that retain their patent protection. All investment
is devoted to R&D. This activity has an aggregate cost of rH + wLR.T h u s ,w ec a n
write the equilibrium condition as (rH + wL+ nmMπ) − E = rH + wLR,o r
E = w(L − LR)+nmMπ.( 5 )
It is useful to calculate an expression for aggregate welfare at date 0,t h et i m ea t
which a new (optimal) patent policy will be set by the government. By assumption,
this patent protection applies only to goods introduced after time 0; those introduced
beforehand are subject to whatever policy was in eﬀe c ta tt h et i m eo ft h e i ri n v e n t i o n . 3
At each moment in time, each of the M consumers enjoys surplus of Cm = h(xm) −
pmxm from his consumption of any good under patent. Here, xm is the amount sold
3It would never be optimal for the government to extend patent protection on goods that have
already been invented. This would create deadweight loss without any oﬀsetting social beneﬁt.
The government might wish to eliminate protection for goods that were invented under a diﬀerent
regime, but we assume that such expropriation of intellectual property would not be legal.
7by the typical monopoly to the typical consumer and pm is the monopoly price. We
distinguish between those goods invented before time 0 and those invented afterward.
The former yield some exogenous surplus that is unaﬀected by the new patent policy.
Of the latter, there are sφ at time s,f o rs between 0 and τ, and a constant number τφ
thereafter. Each consumer also enjoys surplus of Cc = h(xc)−pcxc from his purchases
of any competitively-priced variety of the diﬀerentiated product, where xc and pc are
the quantity and price of a typical one of these purchases. Again, the competitively-
priced goods that were invented before time 0 yield some exogenous surplus. The
number of such goods invented after time 0 that are still economically viable at time
s is 0 for s ≤ τ, (s − τ)φ for s between τ and ¯ τ,a n d(¯ τ − τ)φ,f o rs ≥ ¯ τ. Using (1),
(2) and (5), we calculate that utility at time 0 is






(Cm + π)T +
Mφ
ρ
Cc(¯ T − T) (6)
where Λ0 is the discounted present value of the consumer surplus and proﬁts de-
rived from goods invented before time 0,a n dw h e r eT ≡ (1 − e−ρτ)/ρ and ¯ T ≡
(1 − e−ρ¯ τ)/ρ.N o t et h a tT is the present discounted value of a ﬂow of one dollar from
t i m e0t ot i m eτ,a n dt h a t¯ T has an analogous interpretation.
We are now ready to derive the optimal patent length for a closed economy.
Formally, we maximize U(0) with respect to τ, after recalling that φ = F(H,LR) and
that LR is a function of τ via (3) and (4).4 It is more intuitive, however, to describe
the social costs and beneﬁts that derive from extending the patent length marginally
from a given length τ. The cost of lengthening the period of patent protection is
that the economy suﬀers the deadweight loss of M (Cc − Cm − π) on each of the
diﬀerentiated products invented after time 0 for a marginally longer period of time.
If the patent period is lengthened at time 0, the extra deadweight loss kicks in at
time τ, and continues thereafter. The ﬂow of new products is φ per unit time. Thus,
4Equivalentlly, we can maximize ρU(0) o v e rt h ec h o i c eo fT.N o t e t h a t Cm, Cc and π do not
depend on the duration of patents and thus do not depend on T. We can combine (3) and (4) to
write MπTFL (H,LR)=w, which allows us to solve for the functional relationship betwen the labor
devoted to R&D and the policy variable T; denote it by LR(T). Then, substituting this expression
into (6) and rearranging terms, we can write the maximand as
8the total marginal cost, discounted to time 0,i s
φe−ρτ
ρ
M (Cc − Cm − π).
The beneﬁt to the economy of extending the patent length is that it encourages
R & D ,w h i c hi nt u r nm e a n sag r e a t e rv a r i e t yo fd i ﬀerentiated products. Each dif-
ferentiated product yields discounted consumer surplus of MCmT over its life as a
patented product and MCc(¯ T − T) over its life as a competitively-priced product,
where in each case the discounting is back to the time of invention. Now if we discount
this ﬂow of beneﬁts back to time 0, and multiply by the number of new inventions
induced by a marginal lengthening of the patent period, we have the total marginal











MCmT + MCc(¯ T − T)
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where γ is the ratio of the elasticity of research output with respect to labor to the
elasticity of the marginal product of labor in R&D; i.e., γ ≡−(FL)
2 /(FF LL).T h e
variable γ identiﬁes the responsiveness of innovation to the protections aﬀorded by
the patent system. In general, it is a function of LR and thus indirectly of the patent
length τ. With the CES research technology, γ =[ b/(1 − b)(1 − β)](LR/aH)β.F o r
the special case of a Cobb-Douglas technology (which is the limiting case of the CES
as β → 0), γ is a constant equal to the ratio of the cost share of labor to the cost
share of human capital.
ρU(0) = ρΛ0 + w[L − LR(T)] + MF [H,LR(T)]
£
(Cm + π − Cc)T + Cc ¯ T
¤
.
The ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum requires










from which (7) follows. In the appendix we show β ≤ 1/2 is suﬃcient to enure that the second order
condition is satisﬁed at any value of T that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition (7).





Substituting for dφ/dv and dv/dt in the expression for marginal beneﬁt, and equating
the result to the marginal cost, we derive an implicit formula for the optimal patent
length. We ﬁnd that
Cc − Cm − π = γ
·
Cm + Cc




at an (interior) optimal value of T.
From (7) we see that the optimal patent is longer, the greater is the useful life
of a product (larger ¯ τ), the more patient are consumers (smaller ρ), and the greater
is the ratio of consumer surplus plus proﬁts under monopoly to consumer surplus
with competition.5 All of these ﬁndings accord well with intuition. One noteworthy
feature of (7) is the relationship between market size and the optimal patent length.
In a closed economy, the ﬁrst-best level of R&D – that which maximizes discounted
utility when all goods are competitively priced – typically is an increasing function
of market size. This is because innovation is a public good, and the Samuelsonian rule
for optimal provision of a public good calls for greater output when the beneﬁts can
be spread across more consumers. But the encouragement of innovation by patents
achieves only a second best. According to (7), the size of the market M aﬀects the
optimal patent length only through its eﬀect on the supply elasticity of innovations.
If γ is an increasing function of LR, as it will be if 1/2 >β>0, then the optimal τ
is an increasing function of M.B u ti fγ is a decreasing function of LR, as it will be if
β<0,t h e nτ is an decreasing function of M. In the benchmark Cobb-Douglas case
(with β =0 ), γ is independent of LR and therefore of market size. Then an increase
in M enhances both the marginal beneﬁt of extending patents and the marginal cost
of doing so, but does so in equal proportions. The optimal patent length in a closed
economy with a Cobb-Douglas research technology is invariant to market size.
5The proof of these statements makes use of the second-order condition, which ensures that the
right-hand side of (7) is a declining function of T.
103 Noncooperative Patent Protection
In this section, we study the national incentives for protection of intellectual property
in a world economy with imitation and trade. We derive the Nash equilibria of a game
in which two countries set their patent policies simultaneously and noncooperatively.
The countries are distinguished by their wage rates, their market sizes, and their
stocks of human capital. The last of these proxies for their diﬀerent capacities for
R&D. We shall term the countries “North” and “South,” in keeping with our desire
to understand the tensions that surrounded the tightening of IPR protection in the
developing countries in the last decade. Maskus (2000a, ch.3) has documented an
increase in innovative activity in poor and middle-income countries such as Brazil,
Korea, and China, so our model of relations between trading partners with positive
but diﬀerent abilities to conduct R&D may be apt for studying the incentives for IPR
protection in a world of trade between such nations and the developed economies.6
But our model may apply more broadly to relations between any groups of countries
that have diﬀerent wages and diﬀerent capacities for research. Such diﬀerences exist,
albeit to a lesser extent than between North and South, in the comparison of coun-
tries in Northern and Southern Europe, or the comparison of the United States and
Canada. We do not mean the labels North and South to rule out the application of
our analysis to these other sorts of relationships.
3.1 The Global IPR Regime
The model is a natural extension of the one presented in Section 2. Consumers in
the two countries share identical preferences. In each country, the representative
consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility function in (1). The instantaneous





6He also shows the extent to which patent applications in countries like Mexico, Brazil, Korea,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are dominated by foreign ﬁrms, a feature of the data that ﬁgures
in our analysis.
11where yj(z) is consumption of the homogeneous good by a typical resident of country
j at time z, xj(i,z) is consumption of the ith diﬀerentiated product by a resident of
country j at time z, and nj(z) is the number of diﬀerentiated varieties previously
invented in country j that remain economically viable at time z.T h e r e a r e MN
consumers in the North and MS consumers in the South. While we do not place any
restrictions on the relative sizes of the two markets at this juncture, we shall be most
interested in the case where MN >M S.7 It does not matter for our analysis whether
consumers can borrow and lend internationally or not.
In country j,i tt a k e saj units of labor to produce one unit of the homogeneous
good or to produce one unit of any variety of the diﬀerentiated product. Of course,
the rights to produce some varieties may be limited by ongoing patent protection
in one or both countries. New goods are invented in each region according to
φj = F (Hj,L Rj/aj)=
h




,w h e r eHj is the human capi-
tal endowment of country j, LRj is the labor devoted to R&D there, and again we
take β ≤ 1/2.W ea s s u m et h a taN <a S, which means that labor is uniformly more
productive in the North than in the South.8 This implies wN/wS = aS/aN > 1;
i.e., the wage in the North exceeds that in the South. We also assume that the nu-
meraire good is produced in positive quantity somewhere in the world economy, so
that wj =1 /aj for j = S,N.
We now describe the IPR regime. In each country, there is national treatment in
the granting of patent rights. Under national treatment, the government of country
j grants a patent of length τj to all inventors of diﬀerentiated products regardless
of their national origins. In other words, we assume that foreign ﬁrms and domestic
ﬁrms have equal standing in applying for patents in any country. National treatment
is required by the TRIPs agreement and it characterized the laws that were in place
7We remind the reader that market size is meant to capture not the population of a country, but
rather the scale of its demand for innovative products.
8In Grossman and Lai (2002), we allowed the relative productivity of labor to vary in diﬀerent
uses; i.e., we allowed for Ricardian comparative advantage across the regions. This feature caused
some subtle complications that we ignore here for the sake of simplicity and greater clarity.
12in most countries even before this agreement.9 In our model, a patent is an exclusive
right to make, sell, use, or import a product for a ﬁxed period of time (see Maskus,
2000a, p.36). This means that, when good i is under patent protection in country
j,n oﬁrm other than the patent holder or one designated by it may produce the
good in country j for domestic sale or for export, nor may the good be imported
into country j from an unauthorized producer outside the country. We also rule out
parallel imports – unauthorized imports of good i that were produced by the patent
holder or its designee, but that were sold to a third party outside country j.10 When
parallel imports are prevented, patent holders can practice price discrimination across
national markets.
We solve the Nash game in which the governments set their patent policies once-
and-for-all at time 0. These patents apply only to goods invented after time 0; goods
invented beforehand continue to receive the protections aﬀorded at their times of
invention. So long as the governments cannot curtail patents that were previously
awarded, the economy has no state variables that bear on the choice of optimal patent
policies at a given moment in time. This means that the Nash equilibrium in once-
and-for-all patents is also a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated
game in which the governments can change their patent policies periodically, or even
9National treatment is required by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, to which 127 countries subscribed by the end of 1994 and 162 countries subscribe today (see
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/paris/paris.html). There were, however, allegations from ﬁrms
in the United States and elsewhere that prior to the signing of the TRIPS agreement in 1994,
nondiscriminatory laws did not always mean nondiscriminatory practice. See Scotchmer (2001) for
an analysis of the incentives that countries have to apply national treatment in the absence of an
enforcible agreement.
10The treatment of parallel imports under the TRIPs agreement remains a matter of legal contro-
versy. Countries continue to diﬀer in their rules for territorial exhaustion of IPRs. Some countries,
like Australia and Japan, practice international exhaustion, whereby the restrictive rights granted
by a patent end with the ﬁrst sale of the good anywhere in the world. Other countries or regions,
like the United States and the European Union, practice national or regional exhaustion, whereby
p a t e n tr i g h t se n do n l yw i t ht h eﬁrst sale within the country or region. Under such rules, patent
holders can prevent parallel trade. See Maskus (2000b) for further discussion.
13continuously. Of course, the repeated game may have other equilibria in which the
governments base their policies at a point in time on the history of policies that were
chosen previously. We do not investigate such equilibria with tacit cooperation here,
but rather postpone our discussion of cooperation until Section 5.
Let us describe, for given patent lengths τN and τS, the life cycle of a typical
diﬀerentiated product. When a ﬁrm invents a new product, it immediately ﬁles for
patent protection in both countries. This is because there is no cost of the application
process and no beneﬁt from waiting to introduce a new good. Moreover, postponing
production would generate a loss of value in view of the positive interest rate, while
producing without the beneﬁt of patent protection would spell immediate imitation
and a loss of proﬁts.
During an initial phase after the product is introduced, the inventor holds an
active patent in both countries. Then the patent holder earns a ﬂow of proﬁts MNπ
from sales to consumers in the North and MSπ from sales to consumers in the South,
where π is earnings per consumer for a monopoly selling a typical brand. Notice
that proﬁts per consumer are the same for sales in both markets, because consumers
share identical preferences. Also, they do not depend on where a good was invented
or where it is produced, because the productivity gap between the countries exactly
oﬀsets the wage diﬀerential.11 Households in the North realize a ﬂow of consumer
surplus of MNCm from their purchases of a typical patented product, while those in
the South realize a ﬂow of surplus of MSCm,w h e r eCm is the surplus enjoyed by a
typical consumer of a good produced at a cost of wjaj =1and sold at the monopoly
price.
After a while, the patent will expire in one country. For concreteness, let’s say that
this happens ﬁrst in the South. Then the good will be imitated by competitive ﬁrms
producing there, for sales in the Southern market. The imitators will not, however,
be able to sell the good in the North, because the live patent there aﬀords protection
11In Grossman and Lai (2002), where we allowed for comparative technological advantages across
diﬀerent uses of labor, we were forced to consider separately situations in which direct foreign
investment is and is not a possibility. However, our conclusions were qualitatively similar for the
two cases.
14from such competitive imports. At the moment the patent expires in the South, the
price of the good falls there to wSaS =1 , and the original inventor ceases to realize
proﬁts in that market. The ﬂow of consumer surplus in the South rises to MSCc,
where Cc denotes the consumer surplus generated per consumer by a product that
is sold for the competitive price of pc =1 . But proﬁts and surplus in the Northern
market remain for a while as before.
Eventually, the inventor’s patent will expire in the North. Then the Northern
market can be served by competitive ﬁrms producing in either location. At this time,
the price of the good in the North falls to pc =1and households there begin to enjoy
the higher ﬂow of consumer surplus MNCc. The original inventor loses his remaining
source of monopoly income. Finally, after a period ¯ τ has elapsed from the moment
of invention, the good becomes obsolete and all ﬂows of consumer surplus cease.
3.2 The Best Response Functions
We are now ready to derive the best response functions for the two countries. The
best response for a country expresses the patent length that maximizes its aggregate
welfare as a function of the given patent policy of its trading partner. Consider the
choice of τS by the government of the South. This country bears two costs from
prolonging its patents slightly. First, it extends the period during which the country
suﬀers a static deadweight loss of Cc − Cm − π p e rc o n s u m e ro ne a c hg o o di n v e n t e d
in the South. Second, it prolongs the period during which each of its consumers
realizes surplus of only Cm instead of Cc on each good that was invented in the
North. Notice that the proﬁts earned by Northern producers in the South are not
an oﬀset to this latter marginal cost, because they accrue to patent holders in the
North. The marginal beneﬁt that comes to the South from prolonging its patents
reﬂects the increased incentive that Northern and Southern ﬁrms have to engage in
R&D. If the welfare-maximizing τS is positive and less than ¯ τ,t h e nt h em a r g i n a l
beneﬁt per consumer of increasing τS must match the marginal cost, which implies





CmTS + Cc(¯ T − TS)
¤
,( 9 )
15where v =( MSTS + MNTN)π is the value of a new patent, Tj =( 1− e−ρτj)/ρ,a n d
γi is the responsiveness of innovation in region i to changes in the value of a patent
(in elasticity form).
Similarly, in the North, the marginal beneﬁt of extending longer patent protection
must match the marginal cost at any interior point on the best response curve. The
marginal cost in the North is diﬀerent from that in the South, because the North’s
national income includes the proﬁts earned by Northern patent holders but not those
earned by Southern patent holders. The marginal beneﬁtd i ﬀers too, because the
eﬀectiveness of patent policy as a tool for promoting innovation varies according to
the importance of a country’s market in the aggregate proﬁts of potential innovators
and because the surplus from a typical product over its lifetime depends upon a
country’s patent length. The condition for the best response of the North, analogous






CmTN + Cc(¯ T − TN)
¤
.( 1 0 )
Noting that γS = γN = γ12, the two best response functions can be written
similarly as









for i = S,N,( 1 1 )
12The fact that the two supply elasticities γS and γN are equal despite the diﬀerences in human
capital endowments, in employment, and in labor productivity is a property of the CES research
technology. It follows from the observation that
γi =
b































16where µi = φi/(φS +φN) is the share of world innovation that takes place in country
i. This form of the best response function facilitates a comparison of the incentives
that the government has for protecting intellectual property in a world with trade
compared to those that exist when there is no trade, as expressed in equation (7).
On the left-hand side of (11), the government of a trading economy considers only
af r a c t i o no ft h ep r o ﬁts that ﬂow to patent holders to be an oﬀset to the static cost
of continuing patent protection. On the right-hand side, the ability of a trading
economy to stimulate innovation with a given change in patent duration is only a
fraction of what it is in a closed economy, because inventors earn only part of their
discounted proﬁts within the country’s borders. Both of these forces point to shorter
p a t e n td u r a t i o ni na no p e ne c o n o m yt h a nw o u l db eo p t i m a li nt h ea b s e n c eo ft r a d e .
Against this, possibly, is the diﬀerence between the supply elasticities for innovation
in the closed and open economies; the presence of a foreign country oﬀering patent
protection for innovations may increase the responsiveness of innovation to home
patent policy if γ is an increasing function of LR.H o w e v e r ,w i t ht h eC E Sr e s e a r c h
technology γ is in fact a non-increasing function of LR whenever β ≤ 0; i.e., when
the elasticity of substitution between human capital and labor is less than or equal to
one. In such circumstances, the government of an open economy necessarily chooses
a shorter duration of patents than it would choose autarky.13
In Figure 1, we depict the best response functions in the space of TS and TN for the
case in which the research technology has a Cobb-Douglas form (i.e., β =0 ). Under
such conditions, the supply elasticity γ is a constant equal to b/(1 − b).M o r e o v e r ,
µi = Hi/(HS + HN) for any CES research technology.14 Thus, both µi and γ are
13Suppose the government of an open economy were to choose the autarky duration of patents.
The marginal cost of extending patents would be greater in the open compared to the closed economy,
since µi < 1.A n d , s i n c e γ0(LR) ≤ 0 and MiTi/(MSTS + MNTN) < 1, the marginal beneﬁtf r o m
extending the patents would be smaller in the open as compared to the closed economy. Thus,
the marginal cost would exceed the marginal beneﬁt in the open economy, which means that the




















Figure 1: Nash Equilibrium with Cobb-Douglas Research Technologies
independent of the patent policies in the Cobb-Douglas case. It follows from (11)
that the best response functions are linear and downward sloping and that the SS
curve (the best response function for the South) is steeper than the NN curve (the
best response function for the North).
More generally, the best response functions need not be linear in (TS,T N) space,
but they must be downward sloping whenever β ≤ 0; i.e., when the elasticity of
substitution between human capital and labor in designing new products is less than
or equal to one. Thus, the patent policies of the two countries are strategic substitutes
in such circumstances. To understand the strategic interdependence between the
governments in choosing their patent lengths, consider the choice of patent policy
by the South. Suppose the North were to lengthen the duration of its patents; i.e.,
to increase TN. This would shrink the fraction of total discounted proﬁts that an
innovator earns in the South and so, ceteris paribus, reduce the responsiveness of
From the fact that vFL(LRi/ai,H i)=wi,w eh a v et h a tLRi/aiHi t a k e so nac o m m o nv a l u ei nt h e
two countries; see footnote 12. It follows that φi is proportional to Hi,w i t ht h es a m ef a c t o ro f
proportionality in both countries.
18global innovation to the length of Southern patents. Moreover, the increase in TN
w o u l dd r a wl a b o ri n t oR & Di nt h eN o r t ha n dt h eS o u t h .I fβ<0, the elasticity of
innovation with respect to patent value would fall. The South would ﬁnd that its
market is relatively less important to potential innovators, and that these innovators
are less responsive to patent policy. For both reasons, the marginal beneﬁtt ot h e
South of extending patent length would fall at the initial TS, and the government
would respond to the increase in TN with a cut in the duration of its patents.
A situation of strategic complementarity (i.e., upward-sloping best response func-
tion) can arise only if the supply elasticity of R&D rises as the size of the research
sector expands (β>0) a n dt h e no n l yi fi tr i s e ss u ﬃciently much to compensate for
t h ed e c l i n ei nr e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fac o u n t r y ’ sm a r k e tt h a tr e s u l t sw h e ni t st r a d i n g
partner lengthens its patents. It is straightforward to show that the two best re-
sponse functions must slope in the same direction at any point of intersection. Thus,
if the two patent policies are strategic complements in one country, they are strategic
complements in both.
R e t u r n i n gt ot h ec a s ew i t hβ ≤ 0, it is easy to show using (11) and dγ/dTi ≤ 0
that the SS c u r v em u s th a v eas l o p et h a ti se v e r y w h e r eg r e a t e ri na b s o l u t ev a l u e
than MS/MN, while the NN c u r v em u s th a v eas l o p et h a ti se v e r y w h e r es m a l l e ri n
absolute value than MS/MN.15 It follows that SS is steeper than NN at any point
of intersection of the two curves. This ensures stability of the policy setting game. It
also guarantees uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
We can summarize the most important ﬁndings in this section as follows.
Proposition 1 Let the research technology be φi =
h





country i,f o ri = S,N.I fβ ≤ 0, then the two patent policies are strategic substitutes
15We have not discussed the shape of the best respon s ef u n c t i o n sw h e r et h e yh i tt h ea x e so rw h e r e
the constraint that Ti ≤ ¯ T begins to bind. The SS curve becomes vertical if it hits the vertical axis
at a point below TN = ¯ T. It also becomes vertical if the South’s best response is ¯ T for some positive
value of TN. Similarly, the NN curve becomes horizontal if either it hits the horizontal axis before
TS = ¯ T or if the North’s best response is ¯ T for some positive value of TS.T h u s ,t h eSS curve must
be steeper than the NN curve at any point of intersection, even if these additional segments of the
best response functions are taken into account.
19in both countries (i.e., the best response curves slope downward) and there exists a
unique and stable Nash equilibrium of the policy setting game.
4 W h ya r eP a t e n t sL o n g e ri nt h eN o r t h ?
Governments in the North typically grant longer patents and provide stronger patent
protection more generally than their counterparts in the South.16 In this section,
we identify suﬃcient conditions under which patents in the North will be longer in
duration than those in the South in the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative policy
game. Our goal here is to understand the reasons why the North may have a greater
incentive to grant long patents than the South. We shall also examine how the
equilibrium patent policies respond to changes in the endowments of human capital
and to changes in the size of the market in each region.
We organize our discussion of the national diﬀerences in equilibrium policy choices
around the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose MN >M S and HN >H S.T h e n τN ≥ τS in any Nash
equilibrium of the patent policy game. Moreover, τN >τ S unless τS =¯ τ.
The proposition is readily proved using the expressions for the best response
functions in (11).17 First, recall that with a CES research technology, µi = Hi/(HS +
HN).T h u s ,HN >H S implies µN >µ S. The left-hand side of (11) is a decreasing
function of µi. If we cancel the terms that are common to the two best response
functions, the remaining expression on the right-hand side is an increasing function
of Mi and a decreasing function of Ti. It follows that if µN >µ S and MN >M S,a
pair of policies can be mutual responses only if TN >T S.
Our answer to the question in the section heading is that the North has a larger
market for innovative goods and has a much greater capacity to conduct R&D. Why
16See, for example, Ginarte and Park (1997) who have constructed an index of patent rights and
have shown that this index is highly correlated with per capita GDP.
17There are some details involving corner solutions with τS =0or τN =¯ τ that we leave to the
interested reader.
20do these characteristics induce the Northern government to grant longer patents in
a noncooperative equilibrium than its counterpart in the South? The reasons are
somewhat subtle.
Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that having a large market is not per se
a reason for a government to grant long patents. The optimal patent length in a
closed economy can in fact be independent of or even decreasing with market size,
because both the marginal beneﬁt of longer patents and the marginal costs of the
associated distortions are proportional to M for given γ, and the supply elasticity
may remain the same or even decline as more resources are employed in R&D. The
role of market size in generating diﬀerent incentives for the governments has to do,
instead, with the relative eﬀectiveness of the two policy instruments. If MN is larger
than MS,i n n o v a t i v eﬁrms earn a majority of their proﬁts in the North. Then, a
given change in TN will generate a larger response of global innovation than would
t h es a m ec h a n g ei nTS. Since each policy generate deadweight loss in the country
that aﬀords the protection, the country that can more eﬀectively stimulate innovation
with a given lengthening of its patents will have an incentive to grant longer patents,
all else equal.
The endowment of human capital proxies in our model for the capacity to conduct
R&D. With HN >H S, a majority of the world’s research is carried out in the North.
As a consequence, a majority of the world’s proﬁts from innovative products accrue
to residents of the North. In the North, the marginal cost of lengthening patents
reﬂects the attendant loss in consumer surplus on all innovative products less the
proﬁts that are captured by Northern producers. Similarly, the marginal cost of
lengthening patents in the South reﬂects the loss of consumer surplus there less the
proﬁts captured by Southern producers. But since the Northern producers earn a
majority of the proﬁts, the oﬀset to marginal cost is larger in the North than in
the South. Accordingly, the government of the North has less of a temptation to
terminate its patents earlier than does the government of the South.
We turn next to the comparative static properties of the model. For this, we












Figure 2: Comparative Static Eﬀects of an Increase in HS/HN
which necessarily arises when (but not only when) β ≤ 0.
Consider ﬁrst the factor endowments. An equiproportionate change in HS and
HN has no eﬀect on µS or µN, and thus no eﬀect on the best response functions or
the Nash equilibrium. Policy outcomes change only when there is a change in the
relative endowments of human capital in the two countries. Suppose HS/HN rises.
This increases the share of innovation that occurs in the South (µS) and reduces the
s h a r ei nt h eN o r t h( µN). From (11) we see that the SS curve shifts to the right
while the NN curve shifts downward; see Figure 2. The equilibrium shifts from E
to E0,w i t har e d u c t i o ni np a t e n td u r a t i o ni nt h eN o r t ha n da ni n c r e a s ei np a t e n t
duration in the South. This result is consistent with the Ginarte and Park (1997)
ﬁnding that patent rights are positively correlated in a cross-national sample with
secondary school enrollment rates and with the share of R&D in GDP.
We turn to the eﬀects of market size. If MS and MN grow equiproportionately, the
term MiTi/(MSTS+MNTN) on the right-hand side of (11) is not aﬀected at the initial
values of TS and TN. Then, if β =0(Cobb-Douglas research technology), γ also is
constant, and there is no eﬀect on patent policy in either country. However, if β<0,
22the extra resources that are drawn into R&D reduce the supply elasticity of innovation
with respect to the value of a patent. Then the duration of patent protection falls
in both countries. This is similar to our ﬁn d i n gf o rac l o s e de c o n o m yt h a t ,w h e n
β<0, the optimal patent length shrinks when the market for diﬀerentiated products
expands.
Next consider an expansion in the size of the Southern market, with no change
in market size in the North. If β =0 , γ is constant, and an increase in MS has
qualitatively the same eﬀects as an increase in µS;t h e s ee ﬀects are shown in Figure
2, where we see that patent length in the South grows while that in the North shrinks.
However, if β<0, the increase in MS reduces γ at the initial values of TS and TN.
Relative to the situation depicted in Figure 2, there is a further downward shift in NN
a n da no ﬀsetting leftward shift in SS. Indeed, if the supply elasticity of innovation
falls by enough, the SS curve might even shift to its left relative to its initial location
before the market expansion. In such circumstances TS might fall as MS grows.
5 International Patent Agreements
In this section, we study international patent agreements. We begin by characterizing
the combinations of patent policies that are jointly eﬃcient for the two countries.18
Then we compare the Nash equilibrium outcomes with the eﬃcient policies, to identify
changes in the patent regime that ought to be eﬀected by an international treaty.
Finally, we address the issue of policy harmonization. By that point, we will have seen
that harmonization is not necessary for global eﬃciency. We proceed to investigate
the distributional properties of an agreement calling for harmonized patent policies
and ask whether both countries would beneﬁt from such an agreement in the absence
of some form of direct compensation.
18Ours is a constrained eﬃciency, becuase we assme that innovation must be done privately, and
that patents are the only policies available to encourage R&D. We do not, for example, allow the
governments to introduce R&D subsidies, which if feasible, might allow them to achieve a given rate
of innovation with shorter patents and less deadweight loss.
235.1 Eﬃcient Patent Regimes
We shall begin by showing that the sum of the welfare levels of the two countries
depends only on a measure Q of the overall protection aﬀorded by the interna-
tional patent system. This means that the same aggregate world welfare level can
be achieved with diﬀerent combinations of τS and τN that imply the same overall
level of protection. One particular level of Q —c a l li tQ∗ — maximizes the sum of the
countries’ welfare levels. For a wide range of distributions of world welfare, eﬃciency
is achieved by setting the individual patent lengths so that the overall index of patent
protection is Q∗.
In particular, let Q = MSTS + MNTN. This measure of global patent protection
weights the discounted value of a one dollar ﬂow extending for the duration of a
patent in each country by the size of the country’s market. A ﬁrm that earns a ﬂow
of proﬁts π per consumer for a period of length τS in the South and τN in the North
earns a total discounted sum of proﬁts equal to Qπ.T h u s ,Q governs the allocation of
resources to R&D in each country, regardless of the particular combination of patent
policies in the separate countries.
Consider the choice of patent policies τN and τS that will take eﬀe c ta tt i m e0a n d
apply to goods invented thereafter. The expressions for the countries’ gross welfare
levels at time 0 are analogous to that for a closed economy, as recorded in equation
(6). The aggregate welfare in country i, discounted to time 0, is given by












π (MSTS + MNTN),f o r i = S,N, (12)
where Λi0 is the ﬁxed amount of discounted surplus that consumers in country i derive
from goods that were invented before time 0.
Summing the expressions in (12) for i = S and i = N,w eﬁnd that
ρ[US(0) + UN(0)] = ρ(ΛS0 + ΛN0)+wS(LS − LRS)+wN(LN − LRN)
+(MS + MN) ¯ T(φS + φN)Cc − Q(φS + φN)(Cc − Cm − π) (13)
24Since vS = vN = πQ, LRS and LRN are functions of Q.19 T h es a m ei st r u eo fφS and
φN. It follows that diﬀerent combinations of τS and τN that yield the same value of
Q also yield the same level of aggregate world welfare.20
If international transfer payments are feasible, then a globally eﬃcient patent
regime must have MSTS + MNTN = Q∗,w h e r eQ∗ is the value of Q that maximizes
the right-hand side of (13).21 Notice that a range of eﬃcient outcomes can be achieved
without the need for any international transfers. By appropriate choice of τN and τS,
the countries can be given any welfare levels on the eﬃciency frontier between that
which they would achieve if TS =0and TN = Q∗/MN and that which they would
achieve if TS = Q∗/MS and TN =0 .22
In Figure 3, the bold curve depicts the combinations of TS and TN that may be
chosen in an eﬃcient world patent regime when international transfer payments are
not feasible. The welfare of the South increases, and that of the North decreases, as we
move down the vertical segment from (0, ¯ T), down the downward-sloping line between
(0,Q ∗/MN) and (Q∗/MS,0),a n dﬁnally to the right along the horizontal segment
joining (Q∗/MS,0) and (¯ T,0). Along the downward-sloping segment, aggregate world
welfare is constant. Aggregate welfare declines as we move up along the vertical
segment or to the right along the horizontal segment; this deadweight loss is the cost
19In country i, the allocation of labor to research is determined by
πQFL(LRi/ai,H i)=1 /ai.
20This result is anticipated by a similar one in McCalman (1997), who studied eﬃcient patent
agreements in a partial equilibrium model of cost-reducing innovation by a single, global monopolist.
21The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing ρ[US(0) + UN(0)] implies








The second-order condition is satisﬁed at Q = Q∗ when β ≤ 1/2.
22This statement ignores the ceiling on patent lengths imposed by the ﬁnite economic life of
diﬀerentiated products. A more precise statement is that a range of distributions of maximal world
welfare can be achieved by varying TS between TS =m a x {0,(Q∗−MN ¯ T)/MS} and min{Q∗/MS, ¯ T}
while varying TN between TN =m i n {Q∗/MN, ¯ T} and max{0,
¡
Q∗ − MS ¯ T
¢
/MN} in such a way that










Figure 3: Eﬃcient Patent Regimes
of achieving such skewed distributions of world welfare in the absence of international
transfers.
5.2 Pareto-Improving Patent Agreements
How do the eﬃcient combinations of patent lengths compare to the policies that
emerge in a noncooperative equilibrium? The answer to this question – which in-
forms us about the likely features of a negotiated patent agreement – is illustrated
in Figure 4. The ﬁgure depicts the best response functions and the eﬃcient policy
combinations on the same diagram.
We show the QQ line being situated to the right of the SS c u r v ea n da b o v et h e
NN curve. This is a general feature of our model, not dependent on any assumptions
about the countries’ research technologies. The reasons are clear. Starting from a
point on the South’s best response function, a marginal increase in the length of
patents in the South must increase world welfare. Such a lengthening of Southern
patents has only a second-order eﬀect on welfare in the South, but it conveys two















Figure 4: Comparison of Nash Equilibrium and an Eﬃcient Patent Regime
extra monopoly proﬁts to Northern innovators, which contributes to aggregate income
there. Second, an increase in τS enhances the incentives for R&D, inducing an increase
in both φS and φN. The extra product diversity that results from this R&D creates
additional surplus for Northern consumers.23
By the same token, a marginal increase in the length of Northern patents from
a point along NN increases world welfare. Such a change in policy enhances proﬁt
income for Southern ﬁrms, and encourages additional innovation in both countries.
It follows, of course, that the QQ line must lie outside the Nash equilibrium. We
record our ﬁnding in
Proposition 3 Let (TS,T N) be an interior equilibrium in the noncooperative policy
game and let (T ∗
S,T∗
N) be any eﬃcient combination of patent policies. Then MST∗
S +
MNT ∗
N >M STS + MNTN.
The proposition implies that, starting from any interior Nash equilibrium, an eﬃcient
23A more formal proof that the QQ line lies outside the SS curve and the NN curve is available
from the authors upon request.
27patent treaty must lengthen patents in at least one country. It also implies that the
treaty will strengthen global incentives for R&D and induce more rapid innovation
in both countries.
5.3 Harmonization
Commentators sometimes claim that it would be desirable to have universal standards
for intellectual property protection and for many other national policies that aﬀect
international competition. The arguments for harmonization are not always clear, but
they seem to be based on a desire for global eﬃciency. Yet it is hardly obvious why
eﬃciency should require identical policies in countries at diﬀerent stages of economic
development. In this section, we examine the aggregate and distributional eﬀects of
international harmonization of patent policies.
As should be apparent from the preceding discussion, harmonization of patent
policies is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for global eﬃciency, regardless of whether
international transfer payments are feasible or not. A regime of harmonized policies
will only be eﬃcient if the common duration of patents in the two countries is such
that Q = Q∗. And any combination of patent policies that provides the proper global
incentives for R&D will be eﬃcient, no matter whether the patent lengths in the two
countries are the same or not.
If patents are longer in the North than in the South in an initial Nash equilib-
rium, then harmonization might be achieved either by a unilateral lengthening of
patents in the South or by a combination of policy changes in the two countries. A
unilateral lengthening of Southern patents is bound to harm the South (absent any
side payments), because the equilibrium τS is a best response by the South and any
unilateral deviation from a country’s best response is, by deﬁnition, damaging to its
interests.24 As for harmonization that might be achieved through a combination of
24See also Lai and Qiu (2002), who consider the welfare eﬀects of harmonizing IPR protection
at the standard that would be chosen by the North in a non-cooperative equilibrium. In a model
of once-oﬀ investment in R&D, they show that such a change in the South’s policy from the Nash
equilibrium level would beneﬁt the North by more than it would harm the South.
28policy changes, we focus on a treaty that would achieve global eﬃciency. Such a
treaty is represented by point H in Figure 4. Eﬃcient harmonization surely requires
an increase in patent duration in the South, since τN >τ S at E and QQ lies outside
this point. If β ≤ 0,i ta l s or e q u i r e sa ni n c r e a s ei np a t e n tl e n g t hi nt h eN o r t h . 25 If
MN ≥ MS and HN ≥ HS,t h eN o r t hd e ﬁnitely gains from eﬃcient harmonization.26
However, the South may be worse oﬀ at point H than in the Nash equilibrium at
point E, unless some form of compensation is provided by the North. In general, the
larger are MN/MS and HN/HS, the more likely it is that the South would lose from
eﬃcient harmonization.
Summarizing, we have
Proposition 4 Suppose MN ≥ MS, HN ≥ HS,a n dβ ≤ 0.T h e n e ﬃcient harmo-
nization requires a lengthening of patents in both countries. The North necessarily
gains from eﬃcient harmonization, while the South may gain or lose.
We conclude that harmonization has more to do with distribution than with eﬃciency,
and that incorporation of such provisions in a treaty like the TRIPs agreement might
well beneﬁt the North at the expense of the South.27
25First, we note that when β ≤ 0,p o i n tH lies above the intersection of the NN curve with the
vertical axis. This can be seen by substituting TN = TS in the ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing
ρ[US(0) + UN(0)] and comparing the resulting expression for TN = Q∗/(MN + MS) with the ex-
pression for TN that comes from (11) when TS =0 . Then, since the NN curve is downward sloping
when β ≤ 0, the fact that it starts below point H implies that the Northern patent length is longer
at point H than it is at point E.
26If MN ≥ MS and HN ≥ HS, the common patent length that maximizes the welfare of the North
is greater than the common patent length that maximizes aggregate world welfare. Therefore, the
North gains from a unilateral increase in τS that brings the Southern patent policy into conformity
with the Nash equilibrium policy in the North, and further gains from an increase in the common
policy until Q = Q∗.
27McCalman (2000) estimates the income transfers implicit in the TRIPs agreements and ﬁnds
that international patent harmonization beneﬁts the United States at the expense of the developing
countries as well as Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan.
296 Patent Policy with Many Countries
In this section, we extend our analysis to a trading world with many countries. Our
main ﬁnding is that adding countries exacerbates the free-rider problem that plagues
the noncooperative policy equilibrium. Small countries are inclined to allow others
to provide the incentives for innovation so as to avoid the deadweight losses in their
home markets. In the limit, as the number of countries grows large and each one is
small in relation to the world economy, the unique Nash equilibrium has universal
patents of length zero. Then, a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for
private innovation.
We assume that there are J countries, and that country i has market size Mi,
human capital endowment Hi, and labor productivity 1/ai. The research technology
in country i is φi = F (Hi,L Ri/ai)=
h




,w i t hβ ≤ 1/2.A l l
consumers share the preferences given in (8).
Suppose that there is no cooperation between nations in setting their patent poli-
cies. In country i,e i t h e rTi =0and the marginal cost of providing the ﬁrst bit of
patent protection exceeds the marginal beneﬁt, or Ti = ¯ T and the marginal beneﬁto f
providing the last bit of patent protection exceeds the marginal cost, or 0 <T i < ¯ T
and the marginal beneﬁt of lengthening patents equals the marginal cost. Equality
between marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost implies
Cc − Cm − µiπ =
Mi
Q
γ[TiCm + Cc(¯ T − Ti)] ,( 1 4 )
where Q =
P
j MjTj measures the global patent protection in the Nash equilibrium.
Observe ﬁrst that as µi → 0, the left-hand side of (14) approaches Cc−Cm;as m a l l
country captures virtually none of the monopoly proﬁts from innovative products, so
the cost of a patent per consumer and product is the diﬀerence between the compet-
itive and monopoly levels of consumer surplus. But as Mi → 0, the right-hand side
of (14) approaches zero, because a small country provides innovators with virtually
none of their global proﬁts and so worldwide innovation is hardly responsive to a
change in such a country’s patent policy. It follows that a small country (in a world
with some large countries) will set its patent length to zero in a Nash equilibrium.
30If all countries choose positive patent lengths that are less than ¯ T, equation (14)
holds for every i. Then we can sum (14) across the J countries, which gives
J (Cc − Cm) − π = γ









.( 1 5 )
Then, for a given size of the world market, Q depends only on the number of countries
J and not on the distribution of consumers and human capital across countries.
Moreover, if β ≤ 0, Q is a declining function of J; the greater is the number of
countries, the weaker are the global incentives for innovation in a noncooperative
equilibrium. As the number of countries grows large (holding constant the size of the
world market), the aggregate incentives for innovation approach zero.28 Evidently, the
free-rider problem becomes increasingly severe as the number of independent decision
makers in the world economy expands.
Finally, note that the requirements for global eﬃciency do not depend on the
number of countries. Again, the sum of all national welfare levels is a function of the
aggregate world incentive for innovation. This sum is maximized when
Cc − Cm − π = γ









.( 1 6 )
Thus, if international compensation is possible, an eﬃcient global patent treaty will
have
P
j MjTj = Q∗,w h e r eQ∗ is solved from (16). Notice that Q∗ must exceed
Q, the aggregate patent protection in the Nash equilibrium. Even if international
compensation is not feasible, an eﬃcient agreement will have
P
j MjTj = Q∗ for a
range of distributions of world welfare.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed a simple model of endogenous innovation and have used it to
study the incentives that governments face in choosing their patent policies. Our
28Suppose Q were to approach a ﬁnite number as J →∞ .T h e nγ would approach a ﬁnite number
as well, and the right-hand side of (15) would be ﬁnite. But the left-hand side of (15) approaches
inﬁnity as J →∞ .
31model features a familiar trade-oﬀ between the static beneﬁts of competitive pricing
and the dynamic beneﬁts of increased innovation. For a closed economy, we derived a
simple formula for the optimal patent length that relates the deadweight loss induced
by a marginal lengthening of the period of patent protection to the surplus that
results from the extra innovation.
In an open economy, diﬀerences in market size and diﬀerences in capacity for
R&D generate national diﬀerences in optimal patent policies. We focused on policies
that are applied with national treatment; that is, regimes that require equal pro-
tection for foreign and domestic applicants. A country’s optimal patent duration is
found by equating the sum of the extra deadweight loss that results from lengthening
the patents granted to domestic ﬁrms and the extra surplus loss that results from
extending the monopoly pricing by foreign ﬁrms with the beneﬁts that ﬂow from
providing greater incentives for innovation to ﬁrms worldwide. A country’s optimal
patent length depends on the policies set by its trading partner, because the strength
of foreign patent rights aﬀects the responsiveness of global innovation to a change in
a country’s own patent duration.
We found that having a larger market for innovative products typically enhances
a government’s incentive to grant longer patents. Also, a government’s relative in-
centive to provide patent protection typically increases with its relative endowment
of human capital. In a noncooperative equilibrium, patent duration will be longer in
the North than in the South if the North has a larger market for innovative products
and a greater capacity for R&D.
Starting from a Nash equilibrium, countries can beneﬁt from negotiating an in-
ternational patent agreement. A treaty can ensure that national policies reﬂect the
positive externalities that ﬂow to foreign residents when a country extends the length
of its patents. To achieve (constrained) eﬃciency, an international agreement must
strengthen aggregate world patent protection relative to the Nash equilibrium. Har-
monization of patent policies is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the eﬃciency of
the global patent regime. If patent policies are harmonized at an eﬃcient level, the
move from a Nash equilibrium typically will beneﬁt the North but possibly harm the
32South.
Our conclusions are essentially the same for a world with more than two countries.
Countries with larger markets and more human capital will provide longer patents
in a noncooperative equilibrium than those with smaller markets and less human
capital. Indeed, a country that is small in relation to the world economy has no
incentive whatsoever to grant patents. The greater is the number of independent
countries, the more severe is the free-rider problem inherent in the setting of national
patent policies. Thus, the value of an international patent agreement grows with the
number of independent sovereign decision makers.
Our analysis can be extended to more general environments. For example, in an
earlier version of this paper (Grossman and Lai, 2002), we allowed for cross-national
diﬀerences in relative labor productivity in the two industries. With comparative
advantage in production, the productivity gap in the industry that produces diﬀeren-
tiated products may not be oﬀset by the gap in relative wages. Then the production
costs for innovative products will be higher in one region or the other. This can
create an asymmetry in the life cycle of a new good depending upon whether patents
are longer in the North or in the South. We showed how such an asymmetry may
generate multiple equilibria in the policy game.
Another possible extension would allow diﬀerent preferences in diﬀerent coun-
tries. With diﬀerent demands, the marginal cost of lengthening patent protection
will vary around the globe. Then diﬀerences in the elasticities of demand for innova-
tive products will be another factor that aﬀects the governments’ relative incentives
for granting long patents. Moreover, asymmetries in demand would be reﬂected in
the characteristics of a globally eﬃcient patent regime. An eﬃcient regime would
equalize across countries the marginal deadweight loss associated with providing a
given push to global innovation. Eﬃciency requires longer patents in countries that
have more inelastic demands for innovative products, all else the same.
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358 Appendix
In this appendix we show that, for a closed economy, when T solves (7) and β ≤
1/2, the second-order condition for an optimal patent length is satisﬁed. Similar
calculations ensure that β ≤ 1/2 is suﬃcient for the second-order condition to be
satisﬁed for the best response given by (11) for an open economy.




Cc ¯ T − T
·





Since γ/T > 0, the term in curly brackets must vanish at any local extremum. We
will show that at any such point the term in curly brackets is a decreasing function
of T; i.e., that
−
·









< 0.( 1 7 )
This means that any point satisfying the ﬁrst-order condition is a local welfare maxi-
mum. Since the welfare function is continuous and diﬀerentiable, it follows that there
can be at most one local extremum point, and that the value of T that generates this
point is the unique welfare-maximizing patent duration.














for the CES research technology. Meanwhile, vFL = w =1 /a and v = MπT imply













in the CES case. Using these two equations, we can express γ as a function of T;w e










We can now compute dγ(T)/dT, and substitute the resulting expression into the
l e f t - h a n ds i d eo f( 1 7 ) ,w h i c ht h e nb e c o m e s
Ω = −
·








36But β ≤ 1/2 ensures that
Ω ≤− [Cc − Cm − (1 − β)(Cc − Cm − π)+( 1− 2β)(Cc − Cm − π)]
= −[Cc − Cm − β(Cc − Cm − π)]
< 0 .
So the second-order condition is satisﬁed when β ≤ 1/2 and the T that solves (7) —
if it exists — is the unique welfare-maximizing patent policy.
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